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TRADE SECRETS, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND
JURISDICTION
Robin J. Effron*

INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act
of 1996 ("EEA"),1 the first major federal statute to address trade
secret misappropriation.
The EEA criminalized trade secret
misappropriation and authorized broad domestic and international
enforcement measures against trade secret misappropriation. 2 The
statute was ostensibly a response to the growing instances of trade
secret misappropriation reported by U.S. companies who felt that
the patchwork of state law trade secret protections and remedies
was insufficient to deter, punish, and compensate for the loss of
trade secrets. 3 At the time of its passage, the EEA was lauded by
the business community, but it was heavily criticized by scholars
4
who worried that the statute was too broad and too protectionist.
In the intervening years, the business sector renewed its complaints
about the insufficiency of U.S. trade secret laws, and scholars
continued to express skepticism about using criminal law to enforce
trade secret policy. 5 By July 2015, a bipartisan group of legislators

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author thanks Derek
Bambauer, Christopher Beauchamp, Bob Bone, Chris Seaman, and Rochelle
Dreyfuss for comments, and thanks the Trade Secrets Institute of Brooklyn
Law School for its support of this project. Robin Warren, Jacqueline Genovese,
and Leyla Salman provided excellent research assistance.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012).
2. See id. § 1832.
3. Robin J. Effron, Secrets and Spies: ExtraterritorialApplication of the
Economic Espionage Act and the TRIPS Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475,
1476-77 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State-Sponsored
Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage Act, 28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 389, 464
(2006) (criticizing the EEA's inability to address transnational economic
espionage); Stan Crock, Corporate Spies Feel a Sting, BLOOMBERG (July 14,
1997, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1997-07-13/corporate
-spies-feel-a-sting (noting the business community's expectation that the EEA
would protect trade secrets).
5. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, The ProblematicRole of CriminalLaw
in Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic EspionageAct, 80
N.C. L. REV. 853, 860-61 (2002) (commenting on the importance of relying on
civil action rather than criminal action); Press Release, Orrin Hatch, Senator
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introduced identical bills in the House and Senate proposing a new
federal trade secrets statute, the Defend Trade Secrets Act
("DTSA"). 6 This statute creates a federal private right of action
under the EEA for trade secret misappropriation and economic
espionage, 7 and it authorizes a variety of remedies including
injunctions, damages, and seizure of property.8 President Obama
signed the DTSA into law on May 11, 2016. 9
In 2003, I published a student note examining the EEA and
arguing that the broad statutory language and potential for
extraterritorial enforcement created problems for the United States
given our commitments to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS").1 °
Given the recent
legislative efforts to expand the EEA to include private enforcement,
it is time to revisit and update research on the EEA. This Article
examines the new problems and challenges private enforcement of
the EEA might present.
In particular, this Article considers
whether the problems of extraterritorial criminal enforcement
extend to the civil context.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I gives a brief
overview of the DTSA and its relationship to the EEA. Part II
demonstrates that expanding the EEA to include civil enforcement
creates personal jurisdiction problems. Part III argues that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens presents yet another barrier to
DTSA proceedings in U.S. courts. The Article concludes by noting
that the jurisdictional necessities of civil enforcement under the
DTSA set businesses on a collision course with the direction of
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens law for which they
have largely advocated the past few decades. In other words,
viewing the DTSA through a jurisdictional lens reveals some of the
underlying, understated, and confused purposes of the statute.

I. THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT: A BRIEF SUMMARY
A trade secret is valuable, proprietary information or "knowhow" that an innovator, business, or enterprise protects from use by

for Utah, Senate, House Leaders Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Bill to
Protect Trade Secrets (July 29, 2015), http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm/releases?ID=ad28f305-f73a-4529-84ba-ad3285bO9d6e (describing the
"much-needed steps" to protect victims of trade secret theft and the
insufficiency of the EEA).
6. Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
7. See id. § 2(b)(1).
8. See id. § 2(b)(2).
9. Press Release, Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President at
Signing of S. 1890-Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (May 11, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/1 1/remarks-president
-signing-s-1890-defend-trade-secrets-act-2016.
10. Effron, supra note 3, at 1475.
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others by taking reasonable steps to keep the information secret.11
Other intellectual property devices, primarily patent law, protect
innovators by granting them a limited right of exclusivity in
12
exchange for disclosure of the invention and related information.
An innovator might choose to protect information or an invention
via trade secret instead of patent law because a trade secret holder
will never have to disclose the information "as long as the
information remains secret and meets other judicial criteria
allowing for the preservation of its secrecy." 13
Trade secret
misappropriation is the unauthorized use and misappropriation of
such information.1 4 Prior to 1996, trade secrets in the United States
were protected by a patchwork of state statutes and common law
doctrines. 15 This Part gives a brief summary of the federalization of
trade secret law.
The Economic EspionageAct of 199616

A.

The EEA is a federal statute that criminalizes the
misappropriation of trade secrets by private parties 17 or foreign
governments.1 8 It defines a trade secret as "all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering
information" 19 that is valuable by virtue of not being known to the
public, 20 and that the owner "has taken reasonable measures
21
to keep ... secret."
The EEA emerged, not from the scholarly intellectual property
community, but from a constellation of business and law
enforcement
interests
that
believed
that
trade
secret
national problem. 22
presented a growing
misappropriation
Reflecting these protective roots, the statute broadened the

11. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-38
(1990) (defining "trade secret" as "information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process" that is valuable by
virtue of being unknown to others); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
12. See 69 C.J.S. Patents § 1 (2016).
13. Effron, supranote 3, at 1479.
14.

15.
16.
EEA.
17.
18.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40.

Effron, supra note 3, at 1484-85.
See id. at 1484-92 for a more thorough history and description of the
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012).
Id. § 1831(a).

19. Id. § 839(3) (indicating that trade secret information includes "patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing").
20. Id. § 1839(3)(B).
21. Id. § 1839(3)(A).
22. Effron, supra note 3, at 1485.
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traditional common law definition of a trade secret 23 and of
misappropriation. 24 The statute's broad definitions and disconnect
from the intellectual property community spurred scholarly
criticism at the time of the EEA's passage, 25 and that criticism has
26
continued over the years of its existence.
The statute's sponsors and proponents predicted a robust
regime of enforcement and protection of U.S. business and
innovation interests.27 However, in practice, the United States has
prosecuted very few cases under the EEA.28

Peter Toren's 2012

study found that between 1996 and 2012, the Justice Department
had only secured approximately 124 indictments under both
provisions of the EEA, with the most indictments coming out of the
29
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California.
23. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be
Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 9-10 (1998) (arguing that the EEA's list is
more extensive than comparable sections of the Restatement and the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA")).
24. Id. at 8 (indicating that the EEA's definition of unauthorized
appropriation also includes state-of-mind elements, which are unknown to state
causes of action, and creates rights against misappropriation occurring outside
the United States, where state laws do not reach).
25. See Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 4, at 433 (arguing that the EEA is
inherently flawed because it is a traditional piece of legislation which aims to
combat economic espionage in a borderless age); Spencer Simon, The Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 316 (1998) (arguing that
the EEA is a limited and insufficient remedy that does not address the needs of
U.S. corporations operating abroad, and it fails to adequately compensate
victims due to its lack of civil remedies); see also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at
Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of a Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 241,
277-78 (1998) (expressing skepticism about the effectiveness of using a distinct
body of trade secret law to protect intellectual property interests). Contra Mark
A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-14 (2008) (arguing for a general defense of using trade
secret law as a distinct form of intellectual property protection).
26. See generally Moohr, supra note 5 (arguing that the overly broad
conceptualization of the word "trade secret" is problematic in a criminal statute
because there is a lack of constitutional notice if citizens cannot determine
whether certain material is a trade secret).
27. Simon, supra note 25, at 309-10.
28. Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret
Misappropriation,22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 483 (2006)
(noting that this is due, in part, to the fact that prosecutions under the EEA
required U.S. Attorney General approval during the first five years of the
statute's existence).
29. Peter J. Toren, A Look at 16 Years of EEA Prosecutions,LAW360 (Sept.
19, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/378560/a-look-at-16-years
-of-eea-prosecutions. See generally Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic
Espionage Act Prosecutions: What Companies Can Learn From It and What the
Government Should Be Doing About It!, BNA's PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(2012)
[hereinafter
Toren,
Analysis of Economic Espionage Act
Prosecutions], http://petertoren.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/toren-eea2.pdf
(including more in-depth discussion of Toren's results).
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Toren's research demonstrated that "[m]ost of the stolen trade
secrets were high-tech," with source code ranking as the most
common type of trade secret stolen. 30 The fact that the subject
matter of trade secret misappropriation actions is complicated and
technical might be another reason for the small number of cases,
since the complexity compels the prosecutor to spend a substantial
amount of time to understand the dispute. 31 The anemic criminal
enforcement combined with the perceived frequency of high-tech
trade secret misappropriation led to the call for a federal private
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.
American
businesses wanted to take enforcement of a robust and federal trade
secret law into their own hands.
B.

The Defend Trade Secrets Act

Since 1996, enforcement of trade secret misappropriation has
been divided between criminal enforcement of the EEA at the
federal level and civil enforcement under state law. 32

In 2015, a

bipartisan coalition of senators and congressional representatives
introduced identical bills, the DTSA, in each house. 33 The DTSA
would amend the EEA to authorize a private cause of action for
trade secret misappropriation or economic espionage. 34 Although
the legislation authorizes a private right of action, the statute does
not preempt state trade secret law. 35 The DTSA also provides for ex
parte seizure orders 36 and injunctive relief.3 7
In addition to

30.

Toren, Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions,supra note 29,

at 6.
31. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 4, at 433.
32. See Effron, supra note 3, at 1476-77 (noting the impetus behind the
passage of the EEA was the presence of "gaps in federal [criminal] law"
addressing trade secret theft because the same act-trade secret theft-gave
rise to civil suits under state laws).
33. H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).
34. H.R. 3326 § 2(b)(1) ("An owner of a trade secret may bring a civil action
under this subsection if the person is aggrieved by a misappropriation of a trade
secret that is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in,
interstate or foreign commerce.").
35. See id. § 2(c); see also Stephen Y. Chow, DTSA: A Federal Tort of Unfair
Competition in Aerial Reconnaissance, Broken Deals, and Employment, 72
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 341, 344-45 (2016).
36. H.R. 3326 § 2(b)(2).
37. Id. § 2(b)(3)(A); Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83
FORDHAm L. REV. 1401, 1436 (2014) (explaining that "injunctive relief is the
primary form of relief for trade secret misappropriation"); see, e.g., Eric
Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. ONLINE 284, 285-87 (2015) ("Doctrinally, the Seizure Provision would
represent an unprecedented innovation."); David S. Levine & Sharon K.
Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
230, 234, 242 (2015) (expressing concern for technology start-ups and
entrepreneurs who may not have the means to pay for such judicial
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traditional monetary damages, the DTSA enables plaintiffs to seek
treble damages for trade secrets that are "willfully and maliciously
38
misappropriated."
The DTSA has been supported by U.S. business and law
enforcement interests, which called the potential passage of the
DTSA a "watershed event" twenty-five years in the making, 39 and
believe that the private right of action will be an important tool in
their cybersecurity arsenal. 40 The press promoting the legislation is
replete with statements about the grave nature of cybercrime and
41
the need for a comprehensive federal response.

proceedings, and noting the potential for these small companies to be targets of
litigation under the new Act).
38. H.R. 3326 § 2(b)(3)(C).
39. R. Mark Halligan, The Passage of the DTSA Will Be a Watershed Event
in Trade Secret Law, THOMSON REUTERS: LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Feb. 8, 2016),

http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/practice-of-law/the-passage-of-the
-dtsa-will-be-a-watershed-event-in-trade-secret-law/; see also R. Mark Halligan,
Revisited 2015: Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: CriticalAmendments to
the Economic EspionageAct of 1996, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 476,
477 (2015) [hereinafter Halligan, Revisited 2015] ("In 2008, this author
recommended two critical amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996:
(1) the addition of a private civil cause of action[, and] (2) the addition of a civil
ex parte seizure provision."); Dennis Crouch & James Pooley, What You Need to
Know About the Amended Defend Trade Secrets Act, PATENTLYO (Jan. 31, 2016),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/01/amended-defend-secrets.html
("The DTSA
in its current form is a strong bill, meeting its original objective of giving
plaintiffs access to federal courts, which are better equipped to handle cases of
interstate or international misappropriation of trade secrets. In my opinion, all
reasonable objections have been adequately addressed, and there are sufficient
protections built in against abuse. Moreover, passage of this bill would
substantially improve the environment for both plaintiffs and defendants, by
making trade secret litigation more predictable, establishing a national
standard for issues like 'threatened misappropriation,' and striking the right
balance of interests to promote responsible efforts by whistleblowers to report
possible violations of law.").
40. See, e.g., Letter from the Ass'n of Glob. Automakers, Inc., et al., to the
Honorable Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, the Honorable Christopher Coons, U.S.
Senator, and the Honorable Jeff Flake, U.S. Senator (July 29, 2015),
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/-cache/files/09ce963b-6166-4156-b924
-ablc7f4098f5/DTSA%2OSenate%20Support%2OLetter.pdf (noting support of
the DTSA by the signatories, which include, among others, General Electric,
IBM, Johnson & Johnson, and Pfizer).
41. Senators Coons, Hatch Introduce Bill to Combat Theft of Trade Secrets
and Protect Jobs, DEL. DEMOCRATIC PARTY, http://www.deldems.org/senators
-coons-hatch-introduce-bill-combat-theft-trade-secrets-and-protect-obs
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2016); see also Apt1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage
Units,

MANDIANT

2,

6,

https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www

/services/pdfs/mandiant-aptl-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2016); Trade Secret
Theft: Managing the Growing Threat in Supply Chains, CREATE,
https://create.org/resource/trade-secret-theft-managing-the-growing-threat-in
-supply-chains/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
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However, the legislation has been roundly .criticized by
prominent trade secret scholars. 42 In an open letter to sponsors of
the DTSA, Professors David S. Levine and Sharon K. Sandeen
outlined their concerns with the previous versions of the DTSA and
43
reinforced the problems that remain with the current version.
They contended that because of several ill-defined provisions, the
DTSA will lead to the rise of trade secret trolls. 44 They argued that
the requisite level of harm necessary in order to bring a claim as a
45
private right of action is ambiguous and will be ripe for abuse.
Further, they argued that because the federal legislation will not
preempt state trade secret laws, instead of promoting uniformity,
the federal statute will only create confusion and inconsistencies, "as
the federal judiciary will have to develop its own trade secret
jurisprudence." 46 In addition to the concerns about the ex parte
seizure provisions, 47 commentators have also expressed concern over
the intersection of the DTSA and employment mobility through
48
restrictive covenants.

42. See Chow, supra note 35, at 353-54 (arguing that there is no current
need to "harmonize" state law compliance programs and that DTSA legislation
would simply add more issues to be litigated in multiple contexts); David S.
Levine, School Boy's Tricks: Reasonable Cybersecurity and the Panic of Law
Creation, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 323, 326 (2015); Levine & Sandeen,
supra note 37, at 237-38; Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against
Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 359, 362-64 (2015) (arguing
that the UTSA has led to substantial uniformity, and the DTSA is unlikely to
bring about more uniformity because of the lack of federal preemption in the
Act, the possibility of conflicting statutory interpretations, and the fact-specific
decision making inherent in trade secret law); Eric Goldman, Federal Trade
Secret Bill Re-Introduced-and It's Still Troublesome, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (Aug. 4, 2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/08/federal-trade
-secret-bill-re-introduced-and-its-still-troublesome-guest-blog-post.htm
(providing an overview of the most prominent scholarly criticism of the DTSA);
David Levine, New Professors' Letter Opposing the Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2015, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y, STAN. L. SCH.: BLOG (Nov. 17, 2015, 9:41 AM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/11/new-professors-letter-opposing
-defend-trade-secrets-act-2015.
43. David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Open Letter to the Sponsors of
the Revised Defend Trade Secrets Act, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y, STAN. L. SCH.
(Aug. 3, 2015), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/open-letter-sponsors
-revised-defend-trade-secrets-act.
44. Levine & Sandeen, supra note 37, at 234 (arguing that the DTSA will
spawn "an alleged trade secret-owning entity that uses broad trade secret law
to exact rents via dubious threats of litigation directed at unsuspecting
defendants").
45. Levine & Sandeen, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. John Siegal, Law and Policy of Employee Mobility in a
Changing Work Force, N.Y.L.J.: OUTSIDE COUNS. (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202751878852/Law-and-Policy-of
-Employee-Mobility-in-a-Changing-Work-Force?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage
=ALL ("Parsing when a federal claim for a trade secrets injunction conflicts
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With respect to the DTSA, I renew my concerns about
extraterritorial enforcement. Using civil law, as opposed to criminal
law, to enforce a rather stringent trade secret measure puts the
United States in the same controversial situation of a disconnect
between the EEA and another country's domestic trade secret law,
and a more general disconnect between the EEA and TRIPS. But
extraterritorial enforcement of the EEA via a private right of action
under the DTSA opens up a new can of procedural worms. Namely,
the robust enforcement of foreign conduct that the DTSA supporters
promise will almost certainly be heavily stymied by problems with
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

II. THE DTSA's PERSONAL JURISDICTIONAL HURDLE
Personal jurisdiction is the power of a court to adjudicate the
rights of the particular parties to an action. 49 The most obvious
source of authority is the exercise of jurisdiction over persons who
are residents of a forum, 50 or who are served with process while
knowingly and voluntarily being within the forum state. 51 For any
other defendant who has not consented to jurisdiction in that forum,
a state must utilize a long-arm statute, so named because it allows
the state to reach out and grab a defendant from another
jurisdiction. 52 That exercise of jurisdiction must not exceed the
limits of due process under the federal constitution. 53
The
touchstone of the constitutional analysis is whether the defendant
has certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state. 54
The constitutional doctrine is notoriously a morass. 55 In the
past few decades, the Supreme Court has issued opinion after

with a state's restrictive covenants law, and what injunction measures will be
so restrictive as to effectively prevent a person from entering into an
employment relationship, will require courts to be much more attuned to
distinctions between the trade secrets that will now be subject to federal statute
and the range of categories of confidential information often protected by
noncompetes and other restrictive covenants.").
49. See PersonalJurisdiction,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
50. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
51.
52.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1972); see also

Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315 (1964).
53. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94
(1980) (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution limits
the application of state long arm statutes).
54. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 291; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 222 (1957); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
55. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 3
(2010); Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction,108
Nw. U. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2014) (explaining that personal jurisdiction is
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opinion tightening up the minimum contacts standard, all while
failing to deliver a set of clear or coherent principles for the exercise
of jurisdiction, 56 particularly when confronting cases involving
intangible harms.5 7 This does not bode well for those plaintiffs
seeking civil enforcement of what is, essentially, foreign activity. If
there are any patterns to be discerned from the past few decades of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, they are (1) a trend toward
increasing stinginess in making a forum available to sue out-of-state
defendants, and (2) the clumsy treatment of whether intangible
harms can be treated as minimum contacts.5 8 Many potential DTSA
cases are, thus, a recipe for disaster-plaintiffs will be seeking to
establish liability over foreign defendants for intangible harms. A
good deal of potential DTSA cases do not involve foreign defendants
at all. Rather, they would be run-of-the-mill departing employee
cases with entirely domestic players. 59
However, as other
commentators have already argued, it is not clear why a federal law
is needed for these cases (beyond securing easier access to a federal
forum) since there are ample state law remedies for such
scenarios. 60 Because of this overlap with state law, the public
relations "sell" of the DTSA has focused on foreign defendants and
foreign activity. 61 Since this is the problem that Congress purports
to be solving, it is worth investigating whether jurisdictional
roadblocks would prevent meaningful use of this statutory tool.
The DTSA itself does not provide a special jurisdictional hook,62
although the statute's drafters might have included such a

"widely described as as a mess, an irrational and unpredictable due process
morass"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 646 (2006).

56. See John T. Parry, Rethinking PersonalJurisdictionAfter Bauman and
Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 608 (2015) (describing current personal
jurisdiction doctrine as unstable and complicated).

57. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction
and the "Interwebs," 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1139 (2015) ("Intangible harms

strained personal jurisdiction nearly to the conceptual breaking point.").
58. See id. at 1140-42.
59. Chow, supra note 35, at 343 ("[T]he overwhelming portion of [trade
secret misappropriation] cases have involved unauthorized use of information
lawfully acquired in broken business deals and by employees who leave and
compete.").
60. See, e.g., id. at 341 (emphasizing that current law is producing
substantial uniformity between states); Seaman, supra note 42, at 353
(explaining that the UTSA, having been adopted by forty-seven states, serves as
a de facto national standard).
61. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
62. As commentators have already noted, "[a]lthough the extra-territorial
provision of the EEA might apply to foreigners who commit an act within the
U.S.,... it does not solve the related issues of whether U.S. courts can obtain
personal jurisdiction over such individuals and whether any resulting judgment
can be enforced."
Sharon K. Sandeen, The DTSA: The Litigator's Full-
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provision. 63
My earlier work explained why extraterritorial
application of the EEA criminal law is problematic as a policy
matter. 64 But the personal jurisdiction difficulties present problems
beyond the policy question of whether the United States ought to
exercise jurisdiction.
One does not need fanciful hypotheticals to test the
jurisdictional boundaries of the DTSA. A look into recent EEA cases
will suffice. An examination of such cases can provide a window
into the future of DTSA lawsuits. The vast majority of EEA
prosecutions for which there are reported decisions involve
defendants who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents, or involve
65
conduct that occurred within the territorial United States.
However, there have been several prosecutions that did involve the
extraterritorial application of the EEA.66 If these cases are indeed
the examples of foreign espionage and cybercrime for which
American businesses so desperately need a federal remedy, then it
only makes sense to inquire whether the DTSA, as drafted, actually
provides plaintiffs with an American forum where they can sue
foreign defendants.
The prosecution of a Chinese company, two Chinese nationals,
67
and a Serbian national in United States v. Sinovel Wind Group Co.
is instructive.
Sinovel involved American Superconductor
("AMSC"), a Massachusetts-based company that developed and
produced equipment and software for wind turbines and electrical
grids. 68 AMSC considered the code and design specifications for its
systems to be trade secrets, and it maintained them on a computer
in their Middleton, Wisconsin, office. 69 AMSC sold software and

Employment Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 308, 312 (2015); see also
Seaman, supra note 42, at 387-90.
63. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012); Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).

64. See Effron, supra note 3, at 1495-96 (discussing lawmakers' concern

with trade secret theft as a national security issue, and how it led them to make
a poor policy choice, which undermined overarching goals of intellectual
property law); see also Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 4, at 438 (discussing

the lack of extradition power under the EEA).
65. See United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hsu,
155 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d
253, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 794 F.3d 787, 789-93
(7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2001)
(affirming the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss by an American
citizen who attempted to sell information to an Australian corporation).
67. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 794 F.3d at 789-90.
68. About Us, AMSC, http://www.amsc.com/about/index.html (last visited

Oct. 20, 2016).
69. Indictment at 2, United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 794 F.3d 787

(7th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-CR-84-BBC).
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equipment to Sinovel Wind Group until March 2011. 70 Sinovel, a
Chinese company with an office in Houston, Texas, manufactured
and exported wind turbines worldwide. 7 1 By March 2011, Sinovel
owed AMSC $100 million and was under contract to purchase more
72
than $700 million of products and services in the future.
According to the indictment, Sinovel hatched a plan to steal AMSC's
proprietary technology so that it could produce wind turbines
73
without paying AMSC for the source code and other services.
Sinovel eventually used the source code to sell software for wind
74
turbines to two companies in Massachusetts.
Two of Sinovel's employees, Su Liying and Zhao Haichun, were
Chinese nationals living and working in China. 75 They recruited an
AMSC employee to pilfer trade secrets. 76 The AMSC employee was
a Serbian national named Dejan Karabasevic who worked at
AMSC's wholly owned subsidiary in Klagenfurt, Austria. 77 Sinovel
gave Karabasevic a sham employment contract for a Chinese wind
turbine blade manufacturer to hide the fact that Karabasevic now
worked for Sinovel. 78 During this time, Karabasevic downloaded
AMSC's proprietary information, stored it on a laptop provided by
Sinovel, and emailed software compiled from AMSC source code to
one of the Chinese nationals. 79 He also traveled to China to adapt
8 0
the AMSC product for use in Sinovel's turbines.
On the facts of the case thus far, Sinovel itself had interacted
with AMSC at its Wisconsin location in a manner that might
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court
sitting in Wisconsin. 8 l The individual defendants' contacts with
U.S. jurisdictions were much thinner. I will take each of them in
turn as a personal jurisdiction thought experiment. What we shall
see is that, while some defendants probably would not be subject to
personal jurisdiction under both older and newer understandings of
the doctrine, other defendants who might have once been subject to
a U.S. state's jurisdiction would escape a forum's jurisdictional net
on account of the innovations of personal jurisdiction doctrine

70. Id. at 3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4-5.
74. Id. at 6-7.
75. Id. at 3-4.
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id. at 5-6.
80. Id. at 8.
81. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[I]n order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam... [it must] have certain
minimum contacts with [the jurisdiction in question].").
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promoted heavily by the same business community that pushed for
DTSA's passage.
Defendant Liying had the most attenuated contacts with a U.S.
jurisdiction. Liying was not alleged to have traveled to the United
States, nor did she communicate with any parties there. 82 She did
not buy or sell anything in any U.S. jurisdiction, nor did she
"purposefully avail" herself of any forum within the United States.8 3
Her role in the alleged conspiracy was confined to recruiting
Karabasevic and communicating with him from her base in China to
his location in Austria, as well as interacting with him when he
visited China.8 4 It would be exceptionally difficult to argue that
Liying had minimum contacts with any U.S. jurisdiction.
It is also unlikely that defendant Karabasevic would be subject
to personal jurisdiction in a U.S. forum. Jurisdiction over such a
defendant is especially important to examine, as Karabasevic is the
classic example of the "departing employee" problem8 5 to which
proponents of the DTSA so passionately refer. Like defendant
Liying, Karabasevic did not work in the United States, nor did he
travel there.8 6 His work for AMSC seemed to be confined entirely to
his relationship with AMSC's wholly owned subsidiary in
Klagenfurt, Austria.8 7 Working for AMSC's Austrian subsidiary
does bring him much closer to the United States than Liying. But
simply working for a foreign subsidiary of an American company,
without any other connections to the forum state, does not make a
88
minimum contact.
Investigating Karabasevic's downloading activity would be a
more promising avenue for finding that he had minimum contacts
with a U.S. jurisdiction. Karabasevic is alleged to have stolen
proprietary information from AMSC by downloading it onto a laptop
and then transmitting it to Sinovel.8 9
The information that
Karabasevic downloaded was stored on a computer in Wisconsin at
one of AMSC's offices. 90 Although the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue, appellate courts have dealt with cases
of computer access from outside of a forum state. MacDermid, Inc.

82. Indictment, supra note 69, at 1-11.
83. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
84. Indictment, supra note 69, at 4-6, 8-9.
85. See Chow, supra note 35, at 343 ("[T]he overwhelming portion of [trade
secret misappropriation] cases have involved unauthorized use of information
lawfully acquired in broken business deals and by employees who leave and
compete.").
86. Indictment, supra note 69, at 4.
87. Id.
88. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758-60 (2014) (rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's agency theory of foreign corporations with U.S. subsidiaries).
89. Indictment, supranote 69, at 5-6.
90. Id. at 2, 5.
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v. Deiter91 is one such case involving trade secrets. There, the
Second Circuit held that an Ontario woman could be subject to
personal jurisdiction in Connecticut because she used and accessed a
computer within the state. 92 The defendant was a former employee
of MacDermid's Canadian subsidiary who downloaded proprietary
information stored on MacDermid's Connecticut computers after
finding out that she had been terminated. 93 The court was careful to
delineate the ways in which the defendant's contact was purposeful
and targeted toward the forum state, finding that "she was aware 'of
the centralization and housing of the companies' e-mail system and
the storage of confidential, proprietary information and trade
secrets' in Waterbury, Connecticut." 94 The court then contrasted
this fact with the observation that "[m]ost Internet users, perhaps,
have no idea of the location of the servers through which they send
their emails." 95 Thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction was tied
to the physical location of the computers and servers in Connecticut,
as well as the defendant's explicit knowledge of this fact.
The court did acknowledge that the defendant "directed her
allegedly tortious conduct towards ... a Connecticut corporation,"
citing the "Calder Effects Test."96 However, it is unclear from the
opinion and other recent jurisprudence that downloading computer
information from a corporation in a given jurisdiction is, without
other contacts, enough to constitute an express targeting of the
corporation where it is located. 97 If a corporation's servers or
computers are located in a different forum, or if the defendant does
not know where the corporation is located, the case for personal
jurisdiction is markedly weaker. In the age of cloud computing, the
former is increasingly likely. And given the broad spectrum of
relationships that an employee of a subsidiary might have with a
parent company, knowledge of the parent company's whereabouts
98
and interests might be difficult for some plaintiffs to allege.

91. 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012).
92. Id. at 726-27.
93. Id. at 727.
94. Id. at 730.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 730 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)).
97. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2014); Zherebko v.
Reutskyy, No. C 13-00843 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113493, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 2013); Nolen-Hoeksema v. Maquet Cardiopulmonary AG, No.
NNHCV146049888S, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2062, at *1 (Aug. 5, 2015).
98. Notice also that any plausible argument for personal jurisdiction over
defendants Liying and Karabasevic would require a court to take a fairly
substantial peek into the merits of the case itself, a problem typical of cases
that involve both intentional torts and intangible harms. See Cassandra Burke

Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2012) (examining the "inextricable-merits" problem in
personal jurisdiction, which often unconsciously influences courts' decisions on
personal jurisdiction).
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The strongest cases for personal jurisdiction would be over
defendants Sinovel and Haichun. As to defendant Sinovel, there is a
stronger Calder Effects Test argument because AMSC's competitor
actively sought out AMSC in Wisconsin, where one of its offices is
located, and targeted it there. 99 Sinovel does have an American
subsidiary located in Texas, but under the recent Supreme Court
decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 0 0 this is unlikely to be
But defendants Sinovel and
considered a sufficient contact.10 1
Haichun have other contacts with an American forum, namely, the
102
sale of the pilfered information to companies in Massachusetts.
The direct sale of AMSC's proprietary information into
Massachusetts is precisely the sort of purposeful availment of a
forum state that the Supreme Court has found to be an adequate
03
minimum contact. 1
A final possibility for exercising personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants is the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(2).104 This seldom-invoked provision applies to "claims] that
arise[] under federal law" and allows the courts to treat the United
States as a whole for purposes of minimum contacts if "the
defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of
general jurisdiction."'1 5 Rule 4(k)(2) is unlikely to provide a viable
personal jurisdiction option for more than a handful of potential
DTSA defendants.
As an initial matter, the rule's clumsy
106
construction "poses practical difficulties for a district court,"
because it either requires the plaintiff to prove a negative as to all
fifty states or the defendant to essentially "concede its potential
amenability to suit in federal court (by denying its amenability to
Beyond Rule 4(k)(2)'s awkward
suit in any state court)." 10 7

99. The aiming and targeting argument for defendant Haichun would
proceed more or less like that of the other individual defendants.
100. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
101. Id. at 759 (considering whether a "subsidiary's jurisdictional contacts
can be imputed to its parent.., when the former is so dominated by the latter
as to be its alter ego" and holding that it cannot).
102. Erin Ailworth, Chinese Firm Charged with Stealing Tech from Mass.
Company, Bos. GLOBE (June 27, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business
/2013/06/27/feds-charge-chinese-firm-with-stealing-technology-mass-company
-amsc/CTE66TzhtD 19qvEfU35RQN/story.html.
103. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011); Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); Licci v. Lebanese
Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2013); Chloe v. Queen Bee of
Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2010); Divicino v. Polaris Indus.,
129 F. Supp. 2d 425, 434 (D.Conn. 2001).
104.
105.

See Seaman, supra note 42, at 368.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

106. Synthes (U.S.A) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, 563
F.3d 1285, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
107. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1413 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
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construction, nationwide service of process is unlikely to help in
most DTSA cases because the contacts with the United States are so
diffused that they unlikely reach the constitutional threshold of
minimum contacts. In many instances, the contacts with a single
state that would have been insufficient for that forum are the only
contacts with the United States as a whole, thus, Rule 4(k)(2) adds
little to the analysis. The existence of a single or pair of additional
contacts in other U.S. states might inch closer to the minimum
contacts threshold, but these are not cases like J. McIntyre in which
treating the United States as a single market would drastically
transform the minimum contacts analysis. 108 There might be the
occasional DTSA action in which a foreign party had regular
commercial contact with a variety of states that, put together,
amount to minimum contacts. But the facts of a case like Sinovel
suggest that treating the United States as a single jurisdiction
would not change the party's paucity of contacts to begin with.
Moreover, as is discussed in the next Part, modern forum non
conveniens acts are a robust backstop to cases in which minimum
contacts are marginal at best. Therefore, even a legitimate use of
Rule 4(k)(2) has its limits.
This Part has surveyed the possibilities for jurisdiction over
these defendants in the Sinovel hypothetical. While this is an
important exercise in imagining how a specific DTSA case might
play out, it is important to take a step back and observe what we
can learn from this thought experiment. This Article uses the
Sinovel facts because they represent the kind of trade secret
misappropriation that DTSA proponents purport to target, and
because this case presents a range of defendants and behaviors.
Sinovel teaches us that personal jurisdiction is problematic in DTSA
cases because of its vagaries, particularly when a case involves
intangible harms, and because some defendants are more
susceptible to the jurisdiction of a given American forum than
others. The argument is not that personal jurisdiction will be nigh
impossible in all DTSA cases. Rather, it is that personal jurisdiction
will often preclude a plaintiff from bringing an action, and that in
some instances, there will not be a single American forum in which
the plaintiff can bring one lawsuit against all defendants. Corporate
defendants have spent a few decades and a good deal of litigation
energy convincing the Supreme Court to be wary of cases that
involve primarily foreign conduct, and even if the plaintiffs squeak
through on personal jurisdiction, another hurdle awaits them on the
other side.

108. Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market.").
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III. ANOTHER STUMBLING BLOCK: FORUM NON CONVENIENS
As this Article has already discussed, plaintiffs seeking to
establish personal jurisdiction over potential foreign DTSA
defendants face a tough uphill battle. But the previous Part also
demonstrated that personal jurisdiction is not necessarily a
completely lost cause. Depending on the facts of a given case, some
defendants might have contacts with a U.S. forum that are just
strong enough to establish a case for personal jurisdiction.
Assuming that this is the case, the corporate plaintiffs' fight is not
over. They must contend with yet a second beast of their own
making: the increasingly powerful doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine 09 under which
a judge has the discretion to dismiss a lawsuit with otherwise proper
venue and personal jurisdiction when another (usually foreign)110
forum would be more convenient."' A judge deciding a forum non
conveniens motion considers a number of public and private factors,
all of which are concerned with whether the court should decline to
hear a case because another forum would be a more appropriate
venue for resolution of the dispute.112
In recent years, corporate defendants have spurred the
development of a robust forum non conveniens doctrine to serve as a
bulwark against litigation in American courts. 113 Although some
courts continue to acknowledge that forum non conveniens is "an
exceptional tool to be employed sparingly,"1 1 4 forum non conveniens
doctrine has come to serve as a sort of alternative backstop in cases
involving foreign activity where a minimum contact with an

109.

Forum non conveniens exists at both the federal and state levels. See

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247-55 (1981) (outlining the modern
doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal law); Donald Earl Childress III,
Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational Personal
Jurisdiction,54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1539 (2013) ("Most state courts have
recognized the forum non conveniens doctrine in some fashion as a matter of
common law.").
110. At the federal level, forum non conveniens is used almost exclusively for
dismissals in favor of a foreign forum because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) allows a judge
to transfer a case to another federal district. See Robin J. Effron, Atlantic
Marine and the Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 704
(2015).
111.

14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (4th ed. 2016) (summarizing private
and public factors in forum non conveniens doctrine).
112. See PiperAircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 247-55.
113. Childress, supra note 109, at 1536-37 ("A significant increase in forum
non conveniens decisions in federal courts has occurred in recent years.").
114. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir.
2011) (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002)); see
also Effron, supra note 110, at 705 nn.70-72.
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American forum might exist, but the exercise of jurisdiction
nonetheless still seems burdensome or unfair.1 15
The facts of United States v. Sinove1116 provide a useful set of
facts against which to test the potential doctrinal problems of the
DTSA, this time in the context of forum non conveniens. Suppose
for the sake of argument that AMSC files a lawsuit against Sinovel,
Liying, Haichun, and Karabasevic in federal court for the Western
District of Wisconsin. 117 All defendants move to dismiss the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Wisconsin court grants the
motion, and AMSC refiles the action against defendants Haichun
and Sinovel in the District of Massachusetts. 118
Haichun and
Sinovel once again challenge the personal jurisdiction of the
Massachusetts court but lose. They also make a motion in the
alternative to dismiss the case under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Let us evaluate the factors for a forum non conveniens
dismissal in turn. 11 9
A.
Deference to Plaintiff's Choice of Forum and Existence of an
Adequate Alternative Forum
A court will first evaluate the degree of deference to be given to
the plaintiffs choice of forum.1 20 A domestic plaintiffs choice of
forum "is entitled to greater deference" because "[w]hen the home
forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is
convenient." 121 This has meant that foreign plaintiffs are the least
successful in maintaining actions in the face of a forum non

115. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429
(2007) (citing Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994)) ("We have
characterized forum non conveniens as, essentially, 'a supervening venue

provision, permitting displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light
of certain conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought to be
declined."'); see also Childress, supra note 109, at 1543 ("At bottom, the
Supreme Court has created a personal jurisdiction doctrine that provides very
few limits on a court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over an alien defendant.
As a result, courts have created a doctrine of forum non conveniens that seeks
to balance the appropriateness of a court exercising jurisdiction in an individual
case.").

116. 794 F.3d 787, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2015).
117. This is the judicial district in which the criminal EEA case was filed.
Id. at 789.
118. Recall that Massachusetts is the site of Sinovel's wind turbines,
manufactured with source code allegedly stolen from AMSC. See Ailworth,
supra note 102.
119. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-51 (1981) (setting
out factors for forum non conveniens dismissal).
120. See In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 12 Civ. 6653(SHS), 2014 WL
470894, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 6, 2014) (citing Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274
F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) ("In the first analytical step, the Court decides what
amount of deference is owed the plaintiffs choice of forum.").
121. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
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conveniens motion. 122 This, in and of itself, is less of a hurdle for
potential DTSA plaintiffs, many of whom would be domestic
businesses. 123 A lower bar, however, is not a free pass. It is merely
a presumption. 124 As Professor Lear has observed, "Though the
strongest anti-forum shopping rhetoric is reserved for foreign
plaintiffs, American residents find their choice of a domestic forum
125
subject to intense scrutiny."
This scrutiny might intensify in cases where the plaintiff is
forced to sue in a U.S. jurisdiction with which it has very little
connection. When lawsuits involve mostly foreign activity, there is
an increased likelihood that a foreign defendant's only contacts with
an American forum are in a jurisdiction that is not the plaintiffs
home forum. In Sinovel, for example, AMSC might only be able to
obtain personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts, where some of the
defendants used the (allegedly) pilfered technology, rather than in
AMSC's home forum of the Western District of Wisconsin. AMSC
might be entitled to less deference for a choice of forum that is not
126
its home district.
As another preliminary matter, a court may not dismiss a case
on forum non conveniens grounds unless there is an adequate
alternative forum where the plaintiff may refile the case. 127 In trade

122.

See Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 Nw.

U. L. REV. 1531, 1560-66 (2011).
123. Indeed, as demonstrated earlier, the DTSA has been sold as a statute to
protect American companies from foreign threats. See Levine & Sandeen, supra
note 43.
124. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign
Injury Paradox, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 87, 98 n.55 (2009) (collecting decisions
of forum non conveniens dismissals against domestic plaintiffs); see also Pollux
Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating
that notwithstanding deference to the plaintiffs forum choice, the Court "does
not assign 'talismanic significance to the citizenship or residence of the
parties'); In re Herbert, Nos. 13-00452 DKW-BMK, 13-00705 DKW-BMK,
2014 WL 1464837, at *1 (D. Haw. Apr. 14, 2014) (dismissing on forum non
conveniens grounds "despite the presumption in favor of the domestic Plaintiffs'
choice of forum").
125. Lear, supranote 124, at 98.
126. See Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2001)
(explaining that deference to a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum depends on a
"sliding scale" of the plaintiffs connections to the forum); see also Bank of Am.
Corp. v. Lemgruber, 385 F. Supp. 2d 200, 236-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (giving
deference to a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum in a nonresident state when
the plaintiff had significant other ties to the forum). Cf. BFI Grp. Divino Corp.
v. JSC Russian Aluminum, 298 Fed. App'x 87, 90 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing
Iragorri,274 F.3d at 73; Piper, 454 U.S. at 255 n.23) ("The fact that a plaintiff is
not a resident of the district in which he seeks to sue is not irrelevant, but
plaintiff should not be penalized for suing outside their home district.").
127. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429
(2007) ("A federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground of forum
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secret misappropriation cases, defendants will likely argue that the
forum in which the hacking or misappropriation took place is an
adequate alternative forum. 128
In a case like Sinovel, the
defendants might argue the case should be tried in China. The gut
reaction of a company like AMSC might be to protest that China
would be a hopelessly biased and possibly corrupt forum in which to
try an intellectual property case. 129 But, once again, corporate
defendants will find themselves trapped in a doctrine of their own
making. 130
In Piper, the Court described the existence of an
inadequate forum as "rare,"131 and indicated that in order to fail this
test, an alternative forum must be "so clearly inadequate ... that it
is no remedy at all."'132 Courts routinely find that an adequate
alternative forum exists, even in the face of serious procedural and
resource problems. 133 Professors Whytock and Robertson have
characterized the approaches that courts take to this analysis as
134
ranging from "no scrutiny" to "minimal scrutiny."'

non conveniens 'when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [the]
case....').
128. One aspect of the alternative forum doctrine is that defendants must be
subject to jurisdiction there. However, this is easily satisfied by having the
defendants consent to jurisdiction in the alternative forum as a condition of the
forum non conveniens dismissal, a concession that defendants are typically
eager to make. See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1444, 1456-57 (2011) ("Defendants routinely satisfy this requirement by
consenting to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum as part of the forum non
conveniens motion.").
129. See Chun-Hsien Chen, Explaining Different Enforcement Rates of
Intellectual Property Protection in the United States, Taiwan, and the People's
Republic of China, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 211, 213-14 (2007) (stating
that according to a 2006 study, the piracy rates in the United States and China
were twenty-one percent and eighty-six percent, respectively); Donald P. Harris,
The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint,
32 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 96, 97 (2008) (explaining that China's criminal
intellectual property laws fail to provide adequate deterrence to plaintiffs and
sufficient remedies for trademark infringement and copyright piracy); Peter K.
Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property Enforcement, 5
DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16, 23 (2012) (showing China is a major source of
intellectual property theft and piracy); Peter K. Yu, The Sweet and Sour Story
of Chinese Intellectual Property Rights, PETER K. Yu 3 (2004),
http://www.peteryu.com/sweetsour.pdf.
130. I have characterized this as a doctrine of the defendants' own making
because, although federal judges are writing the opinions that promulgate these
doctrines, it is the defendants themselves who are making the forum non
conveniens motions and proposing foreign forums as adequate alternatives to
adjudication in a U.S. federal court.
131. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
132. Id. at 254.
133. See Megan Waples, Note, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in
Forum Non Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2004).
134. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 128, at 1458-60.
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Corporate defendants already have found themselves squeezed
by their own foundation of broad grounds for forum non conveniens
dismissals.
These defendants often win forum non conveniens
motions, but when plaintiffs go on to win large judgments in a
foreign forum and seek to enforce the judgment in a U.S. forum, the
corporate defendants are the first to argue that the foreign forum
was unfair. 135 In other words, the federal courts do not necessarily
expect that corporate litigants can or should be successful in
litigation that is refiled in a foreign court. Thus, if corporate DTSA
plaintiffs argue that they might have trouble bringing claims in a
foreign court, the federal courts might be indifferent to this
argument if made in opposition to a defendant's forum non
conveniens dismissal motion.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the arguments of potential
American plaintiffs that foreign courts might be hostile to DTSA
claims are well founded. Here, we run into the extraterritoriality
trap that I discussed in my 2003 note on the EEA. 136 Even
assuming that a foreign court has exemplary procedures, generous
provisions for damages and enforcement of judgments, and is free
from corruption, the aggressive approach to trade secret
misappropriation taken in the EEA (and thus the DTSA) exceeds
the level of protection that many countries give to trade secrets in
their domestic laws. 137 This discrepancy is not simply a coincidental
135. Id. at 1447 ("[T]he defendant may then argue that the judgment, or the
foreign legal system producing it, suffers from deficiencies that should preclude
enforcement-an argument seemingly at odds with the defendant's earlier
forum non conveniens argument that the foreign judiciary was available,
adequate, and more appropriate.").
136. Effron, supra note 3, at 1495 ("[A]pplication of the EEA to certain types
of information and conduct would protect information beyond the scope of that
required by the TRIPS Agreement, and by extension, beyond the scope of what
WTO member countries might protect.").
137. China and Brazil, for example-both currently compliant with TRIPS'
minimum standards for intellectual property protection-have been found to
very rarely enforce the criminal intellectual property laws they have adopted to
be compliant with TRIPS. See Ping Xiong, China's Approach to Trade Secrets
Protection: Is a Uniform Trade Secrets Law in China Needed?, in THE INTERNET
AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 251,

271-73 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2016). Since 2009, the United
States has recognized Brazil's progress on intellectual property, "particularly
with respect to pirated audiovisual goods," but emphasized that much stronger
intellectual property enforcement legislation is needed on book and internet
piracy.
RONALD KIRK, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2011
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 42 (2011),

http://www.iri.edu.ar/publicacionesiri/anuario/cdanuario_2012/Amnor/10.pdf.
The United States also asked that Brazil look into acceding to the World
Intellectual Property Organization "internet treaties," covering copyright and
performances online. See Marcos J. Basso & Adriana C.K. Vianna, Intellectual
Property Rights and the Digital Era: Argentina and Brazil, 34 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 277, 312 (2003) (arguing that Brazilian courts struggle with
"making paper rights a reality").
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difference in standards. 138
Many World Trade Organization
signatory countries did not even have trade secret misappropriation
laws until required to do so by TRIPS,139 and the adoption of trade
secret protection was seen as a concession to the business interests
of developed nations. 140 Thus, it is hard to imagine the enthusiastic
reception of a DTSA claim in any number of foreign forums,
assuming that such a court would even apply American law.
B.

PrivateInterest Factors

The Gulf Oil/Piper private interest factors will often point
toward a foreign forum in DTSA cases. The private interest factors
include "the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of the unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of the willing, witnesses; ...and all other

practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive."

141

In cases involving high-tech misappropriation, the sources of
proof will often be outside of the United States. 142 In fact, it is the
very nature of this problem-persons or entities outside of the
United States using electronic means to infiltrate and pilfer the
trade secrets of American businesses-that the DTSA is meant to
cover. Consider the facts in Sinovel: the defendants conducted all of
their alleged hacking and misappropriation in Austria and China.143
The computers and other equipment used in furtherance of these
activities were located outside of the United States. 144 While
cybercrime cases sometimes will involve proof that is readily
accessible via cloud computing platforms or stored on servers owned
by the plaintiff or located in the United States, the physical
hardware (for example, computers, laptops, local servers, flash
drives, or other storage methods) 145 will be located elsewhere if the

138. The problem of hostile reception by foreign jurisdictions is already a
well-known difficulty in the criminal EEA cases. Under section 1831 of the
EEA, prosecutors must contemplate the "diplomatic repercussions" possible
from bringing such an allegation. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 4, at 434.
139. Effron, supra note 3, at 1491-92; see generally Jamie Strawbridge,
Note, The Big Bluff: Obama, Cyber Economic Espionage,and the Threat of WTO
Litigation,47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 833 (2016) (discussing various requirements under
several articles of the TRIPS agreement).
140. Effron, supra note 3, at 1493.
141. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
142. See United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 794 F.3d 787, 789 (7th Cir.
2015); Logan Int'l, Inc. v. 1556311 Alta. Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 2d 625, 633 (S.D.
Tex. 2012); EFCO Corp. v. Aluma Sys. USA, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1046,
1048 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
143. See Sinovel, 794 F.3d at 789; Indictment, supra note 69, at 4-6, 8-9.
144. Indictment, supra note 69, 5-8.
145. See Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, PersonalJurisdictionand
Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 325-28 (2013) (describing the
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defendants, like those in Sinovel, are operating completely from
within the borders of another country. When trying to prove the
exact downloads or copying and illegal transfers or transmissions,
plaintiffs might be limited in the amount of proof located within the
146
United States.
In a case like Sinovel, many, if not most, of the witnesses would
be located outside of the United States. This means that some of the
unwilling witnesses would be beyond the scope of compulsory
process of an American court. 147 As for willing witnesses located
abroad, many courts have found that "the cost of obtaining the
148
testimony of willing witnesses weigh[s] ...in favor of dismissal."
Additionally, a domestic forum could be characterized as
inconvenient if the plaintiff cannot sue all defendants in a single
American forum. In Sinovel, for instance, we have seen that one
possible outcome of the personal jurisdiction analysis is that some
defendants might be subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. forum,
whereas others are beyond the reach of any American jurisdiction. 149
This is not unlike Piper in which the plaintiffs could only sue the
aircraft manufacturers in the United States and were left to pursue
lawsuits against the pilot and other defendants in Scotland. 150 Such
piecemeal litigation is frowned upon because courts tend to find that
it is inconvenient, inefficient, and has the potential to result in
multiple inconsistent judgments. 15 1 Thus, a partial victory in the
personal jurisdiction realm might only further a defendant's
argument for a forum non conveniens dismissal.
Taken together, the availability of evidence and the location of
witnesses allow courts to draw an inference about where trial would

technological structure of the cloud, location of networks, and its relationship to
personal jurisdiction).
146. See, e.g., Interface Partners Int'l Ltd. v. Hananel, 575 F.3d 97, 103-04
(1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the ease of access to sources of proof factor weighed
in favor of a foreign forum when the alleged misconduct and key witnesses were
outside the United States); EFCO Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 (favoring a
foreign forum when the alleged misconduct and witnesses were outside the
United States).
147. Tang v. Synutra Int'l, Inc., No. DKC 09-0088, 2010 WL 1375373, at *12
(D. Md. Mar. 29, 2010) (holding in case involving mostly Chinese witnesses that
"[tihe present forum ... could not compel the testimony of [unwilling] Chinese
witnesses," making the Maryland District Court a much less desirable forum

than the Chinese courts).
148. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Arab African Int'l Bank, 48 F. App'x 801, 804
(2d Cir. 2002); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 (1981);
Tang, 2010 WL 1375373, at *12-13.
149. See United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 794 F.3d 787, 791-93 (7th
Cir. 2015).
150. Piper,454 U.S. at 243.
151. Id. (holding that, while it is possible "that if trial were held in the
United States, Piper and Hartzell could file indemnity or contribution actions
against the Scottish defendants[,]" there would be a significant risk of
inconsistent verdicts).
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be most convenient for the parties and other third-party
participants. A case need not be devoid of American evidence or
witnesses in order for a court to exercise its discretion and dismiss
the action on grounds of forum non conveniens. There are plenty of
cases in which there is some evidentiary or testimonial connection to
a U.S. forum, 152 but if that connection is small in comparison to the
amount of evidence or number of witnesses located abroad, many
courts would find that trial in a foreign forum would be more
convenient 153 and fit the Gulf Oil description of "easy, expeditious
154
and inexpensive."
C.

Public Interest Factors

A court applying the Gulf Oil/Piper public interest factors
considers the "local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home," in a "forum that is at home with the state law that
must govern the case." 155
Courts also attempt to avoid the
"[a]dministrative difficulties" associated with litigation "pil[ing] up
in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin," and
imposing jury duty on "a community which has no relation to the
156
litigation."
A DTSA case involving a resident plaintiff would likely be
considered a local controversy. Wisconsin, for example, has a clear
interest
in protecting its
companies from
trade
secret
misappropriation, so it would be difficult to say that it does not have
a stake in the litigation. This distinguishes many potential DTSA
cases from the prototypical "F cubed" case in which a foreign
plaintiff sues a foreign defendant for conduct that occurred entirely
in a foreign forum, for example, Australian investors suing an
Australian bank in U.S. court for securities fraud that occurred
almost entirely in Australia. 157 But, as recent forum non conveniens
cases show, the mere assertion of a state interest in a dispute does
152. See, e.g., Miller v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 380 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451-52 (D.N.J.
2005) (finding that the private interest factors weigh in favor of forum non
conveniens dismissal even when some measure of proof could be found within
the United States).
153. Piper, 454 U.S. at 242 (finding that because all witnesses to the
accident and to damages, as well as the wreckage, are located in Great Britain,
the courts of that country are a significantly more convenient forum); Tang,
2010 WL 1375373, at *12 (finding that a U.S. forum would cause substantial
expense and inconvenience because most witnesses and evidence are more
likely to be found in China); Miller, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (emphasizing the
difficulty a U.S. forum would have in getting unwilling Israeli witnesses to
cooperate).
154. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
155. Id. at 509.
156. Id. at 508-09.
157. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 251-53 (2010)
(discussing an Australian plaintiff suing an Australian defendant for conduct
that happened in Australia).
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not necessarily overcome the fact that the case involves primarily
foreign conduct, because courts will focus on the "locus of the alleged
culpable conduct." 158 Moreover, if personal jurisdiction problems
force the plaintiff to file in an American forum that is not its home
jurisdiction, that forum might not have a particularly strong
interest in the controversy.
For example, in the Sinovel case,
Massachusetts would have only an attenuated interest in the case
since Massachusetts residents and businesses do not appear to be
injured by the defendants' conduct. That being said, Massachusetts
has the same generalized interest in the case as any U.S.
jurisdiction, and a court might find this compelling as compared to
resolution of the dispute outside of the United States altogether.159
Choice of law questions loom large as a public factor in forum
non conveniens analysis. 160 Scholars have repeatedly found that
judges faced with complex choice of law issues, or the prospect of
applying foreign law to a case, are more likely to dismiss on grounds
of forum non conveniens. 161 This factor is unlikely to come into play
in DTSA cases, as the whole point of the statute is the creation of an
American law cause of action that plaintiffs can use for allegations
of both domestic and foreign activity and injury. Yet, choice of law
issues could still disrupt plaintiffs' attempts to litigate DTSA cases
in federal courts. To the extent that the other forum non conveniens
factors (particularly the private factors) sway a court toward
dismissal, plaintiffs face the prospect of losing the DTSA as their
applicable law in foreign court. While a federal court must ensure

158. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Chimet, S.P.A., 619 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2010);
see also Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008),
aff'd, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal after
determining that "[t]he actions not taken by [the Defendant bank] in Australia
were ...significantly more central to the fraud and more directly responsible
for the harm" at issue than the actions by the bank's subsidiary in Florida);

Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628, 641 (3d Cir. 1989)
(upholding forum non conveniens dismissal even when the district court noted

significant contacts with the U.S. forum but found that the locus of the dispute
was in a foreign country).

159. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508 (explaining that courts have discretion in
weighing factors for or against dismissal).
160.

See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a

Convenient Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 157, 167 (2012)

("While it is hard to precisely identify a hierarchy of factors compelling
dismissal, one of the leading rationales for doing so is whether the
transnational case requires complicated applications of foreign law."); Walter

W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying
ForeignLaw in TransnationalTort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1167 (2005)
("The public interest factors ... include . . . the avoidance of unnecessary

problems in conflicts of law ....).
161. Childress, supra note 160, at 167-68; Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the
Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the

Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1192 (2006); Whytock & Robertson,
supra note 128, at 1462.
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that the plaintiffs have an adequate alternative forum, the loss of a
particularly favorable cause of action or source of damages is not a
162
bar to a forum non conveniens dismissal.
Beyond the private and public interest factors, the forum non
conveniens doctrine gives judges a method for sidestepping the
personal jurisdiction madness
altogether.
In
Sinochem
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.,16 3 the
Supreme Court held that forum non conveniens dismissals are
permissible even before a court determines jurisdictional
questions. 164 In other words, why bother parsing the doctrinally
murky, yet constitutionally mandatory, world of minimum contacts
when a wealth of foreign activity makes a discretionary. forum non
165
conveniens dismissal a perfectly plausible solution?
This is the world that corporate defendants have built-one in
which "the federal courts actively second guess forum choice in
international disputes," 166 and where "[florum non conveniens
motions are likely to increase ... in light of recent Supreme Court
precedent encouraging the doctrine's use."1 67 There is some irony to
this situation. As Professor Lear has observed, federal courts led
the way in developing forum non conveniens standards that were
much harsher than their state counterparts. 168 Despite a sharp
uptick in the number of states adopting the more "draconian" Piper
standard, "[c]orporate defendants routinely remove international
disputes to federal court, then follow with a motion to transfer to
another district that boasts more favorable forum non conveniens
conditions." 169 Corporate defendants love the federal forum for their
forum non conveniens motions. As they become corporate plaintiffs,
they are hungry for a federal forum in which to pursue their trade
secret misappropriation claims.1 70 But when it comes to foreign
activity, the federal forum they so crave might be an Achilles's heel.

162.

See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 ("The Court of

Appeals erred in holding that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law
bars dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.").
163. 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
164. Id. at 432; see also Alan M. Trammell, JurisdictionalSequencing, 47
GA. L. REV. 1099, 1110 (2013).

165. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 432 ("A district court therefore may dispose
of an action by a forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of

subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience,
fairness, and judicial economy so warrant."); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) ("[D]istrict courts do not overstep Article III limits
when they decline jurisdiction of state-law claims on discretionary grounds
without determining whether those claims fall within their pendent
jurisdiction .. ");
see also Trammell, supra note 164, at 1110.
166. Lear, supra note 124, at 100.
167. Childress, supra note 109, at 1537.
168. Lear, supra note 124, at 101.
169. Id.
170. See Seaman, supra note 42, at 368-69.
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This canvas of the Piper forum non conveniens factors
demonstrates how easily a defendant can make the case for
dismissing a DTSA action in favor of a foreign forum. It is true that
forum non conveniens analysis is "highly fact specific," 171 and the
"determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court." 172 However, the recent effort by corporate defendants for a
more robust use of forum non conveniens dismissals has pushed the
doctrine in a direction that looks less discretionary and more like a
doctrine under which a court should or even must dismiss a case for
forum non conveniens upon a strong showing of the public and
private factors.1 73 At best, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
throws up an unpredictable roadblock in the potential DTSA
plaintiffs path. Far from providing a sure-fire federal forum for
pursuing trade secret misappropriation claims, the DTSA provides
an unstable forum for the litigation of claims involving forum
activity and a redundant forum for litigation of claims that allege
1 74
domestic misappropriation.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that serious jurisdictional
problems await plaintiffs who want to file DTSA cases against
foreign defendants for trade secret misappropriation.
This
observation is not merely an exercise in applying personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens laws to some new factual
hypotheticals. Rather, it reveals some difficult truths underlying
the DTSA proponents' efforts to secure passage of the law.
The DTSA's jurisdictional problems reveal the downsides to the
enthusiasm with which the business community has embraced and
encouraged the Supreme Court's ever-stingier doctrines of personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. When these companies are
not themselves defendants advocating for narrow holdings, their
associates and trade organizations have been avid advocates in
other cases, filing amicus briefs in some of the most high-profile
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens cases of the past two
decades.1 75 The DTSA shows that, in some circumstances, corporate
171. Jena A. Sold, Comment, InappropriateForum or InappropriateLaw? A
Choice-of-Law Solution to the JurisdictionalStandoff Between the United States
and Latin America, 60 EMORY L.J. 1437, 1450 (2011).

172. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 233, 257 (1981).
173. See Lear, supra note 124, at 100-01.
174. See Seaman, supra note 42, at 359-64.
175. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)
(discussing foreign jurisdiction in light of amicus briefs filed on behalf of the
Netherlands and the European Commission); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d
470 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds
was favorable in a case where amici briefs were filed on behalf of the Republic
of Ecuador, the Sierra Club, and EarthRights International); Bigio v. Coca-Cola
Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing jurisdictional issues where amici
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interests can be trapped by doctrines of their own- making. The
regulation of foreign conduct, either criminally or civilly, is a
complicated endeavor. As I argued in 2003 and as I reiterate today,
simply passing a law that purports to reach foreign conduct might
be insufficient and unwise. The jurisdictional and policy barriers to
actually enforcing such laws are complex.
The law's greatest
champions might be left with a legal instrument that is mostly
symbolic.
On the other hand, the lessons of this Article might reveal
something entirely different. Perhaps it is naive to assume that the
business and law enforcement interests that promoted the DTSA
were unaware of the jurisdictional problems that now await them.
After all, they are largely responsible for the creation of these
barriers themselves. Perhaps the jurisdictional analysis lays bare
the real purpose of the DTSA: to secure a federal forum for gardenvariety trade secret misappropriation cases and the accompanying
state law claims that will come along for a supplemental jurisdiction
ride. While businesses lobbied heavily for the DTSA by beating the
war drums of international trade secret misappropriation and
cybercrime, the reality is that many cases for which they sought a
federal cause of action (and the federal forum that comes with it),
are ordinary cases of an American employee (or, at least, an
employee working on American soil) misappropriating information
from within the company. 176 Preventing mysterious and dangerous
international corporate espionage was surely a much easier political
sell than a case of special pleading for certain corporate interests to
obtain a federal forum.
If this is in fact the case, it might have been wise for Congress
to have taken a longer and harder look at the legislation pending
before it. If the goal was to create a federal cause of action and
make available a federal forum, then one wonders why the DTSA
does not actually provide for uniformity in trade secret law. 177 If the
goal really was to enable American companies to pursue cases of

briefs were filed on behalf of Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights
Law Clinic and International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists).
176. See Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11 Civ.
9505(ALC)(DCF), 2013 WL 410873, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013); United
States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing
employee-defendant who was charged with trade misappropriation as an
employee). Sometimes the misappropriation is not only local but remarkably
low-tech. See United States v. Argawal, 726 F.3d 235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 2013)
(convicting defendant of printing out thousands of pages of computer code at his
New York office, taking it to his New Jersey home, and attempting to replicate
the program for a competitor).
177. See Seaman, supra note 42, at 359-64 (discussing how a lack of federal
preemption, conflicting statutory interpretations, fact-specific analysis, and
embedded state law issues disallowed the proposed federal trade secret
legislation from resulting in uniformity).
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international trade secret misappropriation, then one wonders why
the bill does not contain its own jurisdictional or venue provisions,
such as, nationwide service of process. In either case, a failure to
address these problems will likely lead to difficulties in the
meaningful use of this new law.

